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Abstract 
Electronic payment protocols play a vital role in electronic commerce security, which 
is essential for secure operation of electronic commerce activities. Formal method is an 
effective way to verify the security of protocols. But current formal method lacks the 
description and analysis of timeliness in electronic payment protocols. In order to 
improve analysis ability, a novel approach to analyze security properties such as 
accountability, fairness and timeliness in electronic payment protocols is proposed in 
this paper. This approach extends an existing logical method by adding a concise time 
expression and analysis method. It enables to describe the event time, and extends the 
time characteristics of logical inference rules. We analyzed the Netbill protocol with the 
new approach and found that the fairness of the protocol is not satisfied, due to 
timeliness problem. The result illustrates the new approach is able to analyze the key 
properties of electronic payment protocols. Furthermore, the new approach can be 
introduced to analyze other time properties of cryptographic protocols. 
Keywords: electronic payment protocol; formal analysis; accountability; fairness; 
timeliness; logic reasoning; 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, an explosion of services provided over the Internet has a great 
importance of human daily life. These services are increasingly transferring customers’ 
private and financial information over the network. A novel proof methodology to 
verify secure routing protocols has been proposed by Chen (Chen et al. 2015). Another 
category of network protocols to protect legitimate interests between traders also need 
to be verified with additional security properties. Electronic payment protocols provide 
technical assurance for security of electronic commerce. Sensitive information such as 
credit card numbers and password depends on the security of electronic payment 
protocols. The analysis and research on the security of electronic payment protocols has 
become an important issue in the field of information security (Patrick et al. 2016). 
Compared with other security protocols, accountability, fairness and timeliness are 
additional security properties in electronic payment protocols. Accountability can 
provide sufficient evidence to resolve possible future disputes after the execution of 
protocol. It means that all parties cannot repudiate what they have done. Fairness 
ensures that no one can gain an advantage over other participants by misbehaving, 
which means either both the participants receive what they expect or nothing. 
Timeliness provides constraint of intervals during every step in protocol regulation to 
avoid the time difference utilizing by attackers. 
Formal analysis is an effective method to verify electronic payment protocols thanks 
to its strict and effective characteristics. But current formal methods for analysis of 
electronic payment protocols lack the description and analysis of timeliness. Our 
approach focuses on the description and analysis of three security properties above. We 
add concise time expression and analysis method to existing logical method. The logic 
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reasoning part in the process of the objective proof is based on Qin-Zhou logic method 
(Qing 2005; Zhou et al. 2001), and the time calculus part utilizes the method of algebra 
and set theory. The logical method and the algebraic method are two independent parts. 
They will not interfere with each other or undermine the correctness of the original 
method. The Netbill protocol is analysed with the our method, and the result shows that 
the protocol does not satisfy fairness due to timeliness problem. Then we elaborated that 
the defect can be fixed with careful specification of event time and waiting time. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces related work in 
this area. Section 3 describes the concepts and definitions of the novel logical method. 
The logic analysis procedure is introduced in Section 4. The analysis process of the 
Netbill protocol is illustrated in Section 5. Section 6 concludes this paper and outlines 
our future studies. 
2. Related work 
Formal methods have already been used for security analysis of electronic payment 
protocols for decades (Kailar 1996). They can be divided into three categories as logic 
reasoning, model checking and theorem proving. 
2.1 Logic reasoning 
Logic reasoning is an important formal analysis method of electronic payment 
protocols up to present. Kailar logic (Kailar 1996) is the first analysis method designed 
for electronic payment protocols, which is mainly used to analyse  accountability. But it 
ignored fairness in electronic payment protocols. Volker extended Autlog logic to be 
able to analyse accountability (Volker and Heike 1998). The famous Payword and SET 
protocol are analysed as examples. Qing-Zhou logic was proposed for the analysis of 
accountability and fairness together (Qing 2005; Zhou et al. 2001). Li added the time 
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factor in SVO logic to make it able to analyse the timeliness of protocols (Li and Luo 
2006). Wen put forward a modeling and analysis method of electronic payment 
protocols based on game logic (Wen et al. 2007). Chen combined logic reasoning with 
strand space model, introducing a new logic analysis method of electronic payment 
protocols (Chen 2010). A method applying Kailar logic in compositional analysis is 
presented by Gao for analysing the accountability and fairness of electronic payment 
protocols (Gao et al. 2013). 
2.2 Model checking 
The characteristic of model checking is easy to manipulate. Kremer apply model-
checker MOCHA which supports the alternating transition systems and the alternating 
temporal logic to analyse accountability (Steve 2004). Xie utilized finite automaton to 
analyse ISI protocol and IBS protocol (Xie and Zhang 2004). Guo combined 
communication finite state machine with some new logic rules based on Qing-Zhou 
logic to analyse security properties of electronic payment protocols (Guo et al. 2010). 
Liu proposed an extended deterministic finite automaton which can also analyse 
security properties such as accountability and fairness (Liu et al. 2013). Nevertheless, 
due to the state space of the model checking method is limited, even if no attack method 
has been found, it does not mean the correctness of protocols. 
2.3 Theorem proving  
Theorem proving is regarded as an accurate method for security of cryptographic 
protocols. Papa integrated logic with process calculi for analysing electronic payment 
protocols (Papa et al. 2001). Chun used Coloured Petri Nets to analyze the Internet 
Open Trading Protocol (Chun and Jonathan 2004). Bella analysed the purchase protocol 
of SET with Isabelle and the inductive method (Giampaolo et al. 2006). Guttman 
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applied strand space method to analyse the fairness of fair exchange protocols (Guttman 
2012). Guo proposed a technique for modelling and verifying fair-change electronic 
payment protocols (Guo et al. 2009). On the other hand, theorem proving method is 
complicated and difficult to verify complex protocols. 
3. Concepts and definitions 
The definitions and symbols used in the new approach are denoted as follows: 
Table 1. Basic symbols 
A,B Parties participate in protocol. { }Km  
Ciphertext of message m 
encrypted with secret key K. 
TTP Trusted third party. K  Dual key of K. 
m Message transferred in protocol. (m, n) 
Message m is combined with 
message n. 
aK  
The public key of party A, which 
is used to verify the digital 
signature of A. 
1
aK
  
The private key corresponding to 
aK . 
EOO 
The non-repudiation evidence that 
is provided to the receiver in 
electronic payment protocols, 
which is used to prove that the 
sender has sent the message. 
EOR 
The non-repudiation evidence 
that is provided to the sender in 
electronic payment protocols, 
which is used to prove that the 
receiver has received the 
message.  
T Time of event.   
 
3.1 Time system 
We denote the time when event occurs by adding a condition in the formula language, 
like A m  at T. T is a time expression. This definition introduced the description of 
the occurrence time of sending and receiving message.  
The time expression is defined as follows: 
1. x stands for a constant time element. 
2. X stands for a variable time element. 
3. X|TS means a time binding expression, while TS is the scope of X. 
4. [T] is time expression, while T is a time binding expression. 
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The constant time element is represented by a lower case t, and the variant time 
element is represented by a capital letter T. Time binding expression is a variable time 
element X with a certain value of constant time element as ( )t t TS . In logical formula, 
the time expression [X|I] can be abbreviated to [X], and [X|{x}] can be abbreviated to [x], 
where x is a constant time element or a variable time element with bound value. The 
value of a variable time element is bound to the first operation in its formula. 
3.2 Protocol and environment 
TTP(Trusted third party) is a special party, which is regarded as a fair trusted third 
party. The bank or the arbitration organization can act as TTP. In general, we assume 
that all parties are dishonest except for TTP. They may interrupt the execution of 
protocols arbitrarily. 
Communication channel is either reliable or unreliable, depending on the specific 
operating environment. Usually, the communication channel between general parties is 
unreliable, while it between the TTP and other parties is recoverable which means the 
message will be transmitted eventually. 
Protocol statement defines what message should be sent and received by parties in the 
current round as follows: 
  :A B m  at T means A sent message m to B at T. 
3.3 Possession set 
aO  stands for the possession set of party A participating in protocol. Assuming the 
protocol begins from 0T , the initial possession set of A is 0( )aO T . When protocol runs to 
xT , the possession set of A becomes ( )a xO T . Besides, we define ( )a eO T  is the final 
possession set of A at the end of protocol. The possession set of A contains the 
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information inherited from last step and the message which is received or generated at 
present. It varies consecutively with the execution of protocol until ( )a a eO O T .  
The possession set of A changes from ( )a yO T to ( )a xO T ∩ x( )yT T , which means yT  
is the moment before xT . It follows the following rules: 
(1) When the execution of protocol statement is :A B m  at xT , 
( ) ( ) { }a x a yO T O T m  if m is a new message generated by A, which means ( )a ym O T . 
Otherwise, ( ) ( )a x a yO T O T  if m is not a new message generated by A and ( )a ym O T . 
(2) When the execution of protocol statement is :B A m  at xT  while ( )a ym O T , 
( ) ( ) { }a x a yO T O T m . Otherwise, ( ) ( )a x a yO T O T . 
4. Logic analysis method 
4.1 Logic component 
Our method consists of the following five logic components: 
(1) A x . A can make others believe in formula x by performing a series of 
operations without leaking any secret; 
(2) A m at T. A sends message m at T. The following implication is established in 
the process of analysis: 
  ( , )A m n  at  T => A m  at T                                           (1) 
It means, A sends message m at T while A sends message (m, n) at T. 
(3) A m . A possesses message m. 
(4) A m at T. A received message m at T. The following implication is established 
as the second component: 
 ( , )A m n  at T => A m at T                                            (2) 
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 (5) a
K
A . aK is the public key of A, which is used to verify the message signed 
by its private key 1
aK
 . 
4.2 Axiom system 
The axiom system consists of 1 inference rule and 6 axioms. The inference rule is as 
follows: 
(├ )∩ (├ ( )  ) =>├                                          (3) 
It illustrates ├ can be obtained from ├ and ├ ( )  . ├  represents   can 
be deduced from the formula sets . ├ indicates   is a theorem, which means   is 
established all the time. The inference rule above indicates that  is theorem if  is 
theorem and   contains  . 
The 6 axioms are as follows: 
A1. A x ∩ A y  => ( )A x y  
A2. A x ∩(x=>y) => A y  
A3. 1{ }
bK
A m   at xT ∩
bKA B  at xT  => A B m  at [ | ]Y Y XT T T  
A4. { }kA B m  at xT ∩ A B k at YT  => A B m  at max( , )X YT T  
A5. A m  at T => A m  at T 
A6. { }KA m at T∩ A K  => A m  at T 
The proof procedure of protocol properties is divided into two parts. The first part is 
called logical reasoning and the second part is called time calculus. The purpose of this 
procedure is to prove that the result obtained from logic reasoning satisfies the time 
constraints specified in time calculus. 
4.3 Protocol analysis procedure 
Protocol analysis consists of 5 steps as shown in Figure 1. 
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（1）List the initial possession sets of each party in protocol.
（2）List the initial Assumptions of the protocol.
（3）List EOO and EOR, and analyse whether they meet the 
requirement of accountability.
（4）Analyse whether                        ∩                           is set 
up at the end of protocol.
( )b eEOO O T ( )a eEOR O T
（5）Analyse whether                         if and only if                      
at the end     . 
( )b eEOO O T ( )a eEOR O T
eT
 
Figure 1. Procedure of protocol analysis 
 
5. The Netbill Protocol analysis 
The Netbill protocol is an electronic payment protocol proposed by Professor 
J.D.Tygar in Carnegie Mellon University for trading digital goods, including three 
participants: customer, merchant and the Netbill server (Sirbu and Tygar 1995). Its main 
steps are as follows: 
(1) : ( ),{ , }
CMCM K
C M T C PRD TID  at 1T  
(2) :{ , , }
CMK
M C ProductID Price TID  at 2T  
(3) : ( ),{ }
CMCM K
C M T C TID  at 3T  
(4) :{ } ,{ ({ } ), }
CMk k K
M C Goods h Goods EPOID  at 4T  
(5) 1: ( ),{{ } }
CMC
CM KK
C M T C EPO   at 5T  
(6) 1 1: ( ),{{{ } , , } }
MNC M
MN KK K
M N T M EPO MAcct k   at 6T  
(7) 1:{{ } ,{ , } }
CN MNN
K KK
N M Receipt EPOID CAcct  at 7T  
(8) 1:{{ } ,{ , } }
CN CMN
K KK
M C Receipt EPOID CAcct  at 8T  
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C, M and N represent the customer, the merchant and the Netbill server respectively. 
( )CMT C  is used to prove C to M,  and to establish a shared session key CMK . The 
function of ( )MNT M is similar to ( )CMT C . PRD(Product Request Data) is product 
request data. TID is transaction’s ID and ProductID is product’s ID. Price stands for the 
price the merchant required. Goods is  the specific content of transmitted goods. EPO is 
a electronic purchase order, the plain part of which comprises customer identification 
identity, ProductID, Price, M, ({ } )kh Goods and h(PRD). h(m) stands for the hash value of 
m. The encryption part includes a payment instruction which can only be read by the 
Netbill server such as the customer account. EPOID is electronic payment ID, which is 
the globally unique identifier and will be used to uniquely identify the transaction in the 
database of Netbill. CAcct and MAcct stand for the customer and merchant’s account 
respectively. Receipt includes the Result whether to accept this payment or not, which is 
returned from the Netbill server.  
The analysis procedure of the Netbill protocol is detailed in the next subsection. 
5.1 List the initial possession sets. 
At the initial time of protocol operation, the initial states of C and M are 
 
1
0( ) { , , , , , }C C C M N CM CNO T K K K K K K
  
1
0( ) { , , , , , }M M M C N CM MNO T K K K K K K
  
( , , , )N CM CNM
K K KK
C M N C M C N     
( , , , )C N CM MN
K K K K
M C N C M M N      
5.2 List the credible assumptions 
T1: A N k A B k    
Assume that the Netbill server is fully in accordance with the protocol regulation and 
will not do anything harmful to any party. If A can prove that N has sent k to him, he 
can prove that the other party B has sent k. 
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T2: ( )A B h m A B m    
According to the protocol, the sender sends h(m) for the checksum of message m. The 
sender is able to calculate the checksum only when the sender owns the message m. So 
if A can prove that B has sent h(m), then A can prove that B has sent message m. 
5.3 List EOO and EOR: 
1= { ({ } )} { }
CM N
k K K
EOO h Goods k （ ， ） 
1 1= { ({ } )} { }
C N
k K K
EOR h Goods k （ ， ）  
Assume that ( )C eEOO O T  is established at the end of protocol. Then 
1{ ({ } )} { } ( )
CM N
k K C eK
h Goods k O T （ ， ）  is satisfied, which means { ({ } )}
CMk K
C h Goods at 
eT  and 1{ }
NK
C k  at eT . 
Since { ({ } )}
CMk K
C h Goods at eT , 
CMKC C M and axiom A3, then 
({ } )kC M h Goods  at [ | ]eT T T   . According to T2, we obtain 
{ }kC M Goods  at [ | ]eT T T                                         (4) 
Since 1{ }
NK
C k   at eT , 
NKC N and axiom A3,then C N k  at [ | ]eT T T   . 
According to the credible assumption T1, we obtain 
C M k at [ | ]eT T T                                                (5) 
Due to formula (4), (5) and axiom A4, we will get 
C M Goods  at max( , )T T  ∩[ | ]eT T T   ∩[ | ]eT T T                      (6) 
Assume that ( )M eEOR O T  is satisfied at the end of the protocol, which means 
1{ ({ } )}
C
k K
M h Goods   at eT  and 1{ }
NK
M k   at eT  are satisfied. Then according to 
NKM N ,  axiom A3 and credible assumption T1, we obtain 
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M C k  at [ | ]eT T T                                               (7) 
Since C
K
M C , axiom A3 and credible assumption T2, we will get 
{ }kM C Goods  at [ | ]eT T T   . Due to formula (7) and axiom A6, we will get 
M C Goods  at max( , )T T  ∩[ | ]eT T T   ∩[ | ]eT T T          (8) 
Therefore, the design of EOO and EOR in the Netbill protocol can meet the 
requirement of accountability. 
5.4 Analysis of accountability 
Verify whether C and M can obtain the appropriate evidence at the end of protocol. 
After the fourth step of the protocol,  
4 3( ) ( ) { ({ } )} CMC C k KO T O T h Goods ∩ 4 4[ | ]eT T T , then { ({ } )} ( )CMk K C eh Goods O T .  
When the last step of the protocol is finished,  
18 7( ) ( ) {{ } } CMNC C KK
O T O T Receipt  ∩ 8 8[ | ]eT T T . Because of CMC K , we obtain 
1{ } ( )
N
C eK
Receipt O T  , and 1{ } ( )
N
C eK
k O T  . Then ( )C eEOO O T  is satisfied. 
Similarly, according to the fifth step of the protocol, we will get 
 1{ ({ } )} ( )
C
k M eK
h Goods O T  . And 1{ } ( )
N
M eK
k O T   will be obtained after the seventh 
step. Then we will get ( )M eEOR O T . 
Therefore, ( )C eEOO O T ∩ ( )M eEOR O T  is satisfied when the protocol finishes. 
(5)Analysis of fairness 
The fairness objective is: 
( )C kEOO O T  if and only if ( )M kEOR O T  
All parties in protocol will wait for the next step after the last one. If there is no 
response, the protocol will terminate after a certain period of time t and clear the 
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protocol records before. For achieving fairness, the following conditions have to be 
satisfied: 
1{{ } }
MNM
KK
M k   at xT ∩ 1{ }
NK
M k   at yT ∩ x y x MT T T t  （ ）              (9) 
1{ ({ } )}
C
k K
C h Goods   at xT ∩ 1{ }
NK
C k   at yT ∩ x y x CT T T t  （ ）        (10) 
Mt  is the waiting time after the M executes the 6th step of the protocol. Ct  is the 
waiting time after C executes the 5th step. Since N is in full accordance with the 
regulation of protocol,  formula (9) must be established. 
In formula (10), 5=xT T , 7 5 5 6=yT T T t t   , 5t  and 6t  are the time delay after the 5th 
step and the 6th step. So we must make 5 6 Ct t t   to make formula (10) established. 
But  there is no restrict about the relationship among 5t , 6t and Ct . There is a possibility 
to make 5 6 Ct t t    no matter what the constant Ct is specified. For example, if C 
performs the 5th step in accordance with the regulation, M could send 1{{ } }
MNC
KK
EPO   to 
N after it is timeout and acquire the evidence to prove C has received the product Goods. 
But C has deleted { }kGoods  because of timeout. Even though C has received Receipt 
and the key k, he couldn’t decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the product Goods. 
Then the fomula (10) can’t be established, which means the protocol can’t achieve 
the fairness objective. The main reason is that the implementation of the protocol does 
not have specific constraints on the relevant event time in the process. In order to make 
up for the defect, we should carefully regulate the event time and the waiting time of the 
execution of protocol. 
5 Conclusion 
The analysis result of Netbill protocol show that the protocol does not satisfy fairness 
because of timeliness problem. The process illustrates how the new approach is applied 
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to analyse the temporal relation between events in electronic payment protocols. It is not 
a simple logic method, but an integrated approach. The new approach is appropriate to 
guide the design of electronic payment protocols and fix the defects of original 
protocols. 
The next step of our research is to analyse other electronic payment protocols with 
our method which are widely used in electronic commerce. At the same time, we will 
further study automated analysis tools to make it convenient for design and analysis of 
electronic payment protocols. 
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